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abstract
This note discusses the most important elements of the decision of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (cjeu) in the Cordoba case. The Court ruled that 
the unauthorized republication of photographs constitutes an act of communica-
tion to the public and therefore a copyright infringement. This ruling clarified 
the scope of the right of “communication to the public” in the framework of the 
Infosoc Directive and the legality of republishing copyrighted material on the 
Internet. Its most important contribution is to establish the differences between 
the use of links and framing with respect to re-posting cases. This commentary 
analyses whether it is still appropriate to continue using the criteria of “new public” 
to identify infringements of the right of “communication to the public”.
Keywords: Copyright; Communication to the public; Hyperlinks; New Public; 
Exhaustion of the right.
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resumen
Esta reseña aborda los elementos más importantes de la decisión del Tribunal de 
Justicia de la Unión Europea (tjue) en el caso Córdoba. El Tribunal determinó que 
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el re-posteo no autorizado de fotografías constituye un acto de comunicación al 
público y, por tanto, una infracción de los derechos de autor. Esta sentencia aclara 
el alcance del derecho de “comunicación al público” en el marco de la Directiva 
Infosoc y la legalidad del re-posteo de material que se encuentra protegido por 
derechos de autor en Internet. Su aportación más importante radica en establecer 
las diferencias entre el uso de links y framing con respecto a los casos de re-posting. 
En este comentario se analizará si sigue siendo adecuado continuar utilizando el 
criterio de “nuevo público” para identificar infracciones del derecho de “comuni-
cación al público”.
Palabras clave: Derecho de autor; comunicación pública; hipervínculos; nuevo 
público; agotamiento del derecho.
In this discussion we will attempt to address the decision (Advisory Opinion/Pre-
liminary Ruling) in what is known as the “Cordoba case”, also called the “Renckhoff 
case”1. The request for interpretation arises from the German jurisdiction2, which 
asks the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu) to interpret the meaning 
of “communication to the public” within the framework of the EU Directive 
2001/29/EC3. The request for interpretation in this case concerns unauthorized 
re-posting of photographs on websites.
1. facts of the case dirk renckhoff v. land nordrhein-westfalen
Since March 25, 2009, the Gesamtschule Waltrop (Waltrop Secondary School) 
made available on its website a school assignment by one of its pupils which 
contained, for illustrative purposes, a photograph of Cordoba city taken by Mr. 
Renckhoff (professional photographer). The student had downloaded the image 
from a travel website as it was available without any restrictive measures to prevent 
it. Below the photograph, the student had included a reference to that website. 
Mr. Renckoff understood that he had granted a right of exclusive use to the 
travel portal only. Therefore, he considered the unauthorized use of the photograph 
1 C 161/17, Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber),  7 August 2018, 
ecli:eu:C:2018:634.
2 This prerogative is recognized in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union: “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdic-
tion to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; (b) the 
validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the 
Union; Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, 
that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to 
enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon.”
3 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society. Official Journal L 16, 22/06/2001 P. 0010 – 0019. Also known as 
the Infosoc Directive, it is a European Union directive that was enacted to harmonize 
certain aspects of copyright across Europe.
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on the school’s website, constituted an copyright infringement4. Based on this 
argument, Mr. Renckhoff, initiated legal proceedings against the City of Waltrop5 
and Land of North-Rhineland-Westphalia6, before the Landgericht Hamburg 
(Regional Civil and Criminal Court of Hamburg, Germany).
2. procedural steps
As a first move, Mr. Renckhoff brought his lawsuit before the Hamburg Regional 
Court, alleging copyright infringement. He asked the first instance court to pro-
hibit the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia from reproducing and making available 
to the public, itself or through third parties, his photograph and, subsidiarily, to 
prohibit it from allowing students to reproduce the photograph to post it on the 
Internet. He also claimed the payment of a sum of €400 eur in compensation 
for damages. Mr. Renckhoff ’s claim was partially upheld and the Land of North 
Rhine-Westphalia was ordered to remove the photograph from the school’s website 
and to pay the sum of €300 eur plus interest. 
Both parties appealed against that judgment to the Oberlandesgericht Hamburg 
(Higher Regional Court for Civil and Criminal Matters in Hamburg, Germany), 
which held that the photograph was protected by copyright and its publication 
on the school’s website had infringed Mr. Renckhoff ’s rights of reproduction and 
making available to the public. The court considered irrelevant the fact that the 
photograph could be accessed without restriction by anyone on the Internet, since 
the reproduction of the photograph on the server and the subsequent making 
available to the public on the school’s website constituted a “disconnection” from 
the initial publication on the travel website. Therefore, the plaintiff – unlike when 
setting an electronic reference (“link”)7 – no longer had sole control over his work.
Still not pleased with the decision, the Land of North-Rhineland-Westphalia 
appealed in cassation before the Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court for Civil and 
Criminal Matters, Germany). However, the Supreme Court considered that the 
outcome of the case depended on the interpretation of Article 3(1)8 of Directive 
2001/29.
4 The Urheberrechtsgesetz – UrhG (Act on Copyright and Related Rights) recognizes 
the Right of reproduction in its Section 16 and the Right of making works available to 
public in section 19a.
5 The City of Waltrop is responsible for the Gesamtschule Waltrop. It was a defendant 
in the first instance but it was no longer a party on further proceedings.
6 The Land of North Rhine-Westphalia was also a defendant in this first instance, since 
they are in charge of the inspection of the school and the employer of the school’s teachers.
7 The “link” allows the author to maintain some control over his work, since if he 
removes his work from the main source, the link would be useless. However, when a 
work is copied to another server, as the German court rightly points out, control over 
this work is lost. If the author decides to remove it from the primary site, the work 
will still be available to the public due to the copy that was made on another server.
8 “Article 3 of Directive 2001/29, entitled ‘Right of communication to the public 
of works and right of making available to the public other subject matter’ provides in 
paragraph 1: 1. Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise 
274     .º 31 -   -ju  2021 -  .  271 -  281
Gabriel Ernesto Melian Pérez
In those circumstances, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Ger-
many) decided to stay proceedings and refer the following question to the Court 
for a preliminary ruling:
Does the inclusion of a work— which is freely accessible to all internet users on a third-
party website with the consent of the copyright holder— on a person’s own publicly 
accessible website constitute a making available of that work to the public within the 
meaning of Article 3(1) of [Directive 2001/29] if the work is first copied onto a server 
and is uploaded from there to that person’s own website?
2.1. decision (ruling) made by the cjeu
The concept of “communication to the public”, within the meaning of Article 
3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC […] must be interpreted as meaning that it covers 
the posting on one website of a photograph previously posted, without any restric-
tion preventing it from being downloaded and with the consent of the copyright 
holder, on another website.
Let us discuss the arguments used by the cjeu to reach this conclusion.
3. analysis of the judgment 
After reading the opinion of the Advocate General and the final decision in the 
Cordoba case, one may feel a mixture of sensations, something like a bittersweet 
taste. Although in the end, I believe, that the court reached the correct decision 
differentiating the hyperlinks from the act of copying and posting a work; some 
of the arguments used were perhaps not entirely accurate. They introduced the 
controversial concept of the “new public” while not devoting more space to analyze 
the possible application of some exceptions such as Article 5(3)(a) of Directive 
2001/29/CE9. 
In the “Renckhoff” or “Cordoba” case, it was not the first time that the cjeu 
made a judgment on the concept of “communication to the public”. Since Di-
rective 2001/29/EC is not clear on this respect, the Cordoba case is preceded by 
several judgments that map out what is understood in case law as “communication 
to the public”. Examples include: Società Consortile Fonografici (scf) v Marco Del 
or prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, 
including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members 
of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. 
3. The rights referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be exhausted by any act of 
communication to the public or making available to the public as set out in this Article’”.
9 “Article 5. Exceptions and limitations: […] 3. Member States may provide for ex-
ceptions or limitations to the rights provided for in Articles 2 and 3 in the following 
cases: (a) use for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research, as 
long as the source, including the author’s name, is indicated, unless this turns out to be 
impossible and to the extent justified by the non-commercial purpose to be achieved…”.
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Corso10; sgae v Rafael Hoteles11 and Football Association Premier League and Oth-
ers12. However, cases like Stichting Brein13, akm14, GS Media15 and Svensson16 were 
fundamental to define the features and requirements that European jurisprudence 
grants to this right.
The elements of the case can be summarized as follows. A pupil in Germany 
downloaded a photograph of the city of Cordoba from a travel website and used it 
for a written school assignment. The assignment was then uploaded to the school’s 
website. In other words, the work was first copied to a server and from there it was 
uploaded to the school’s website. Let’s see if this constitutes copyright infringement 
under European law, according to the reasoning of the cjeu.
3.1. The existence of a protected work (possible lack of originality)
It is usual that when a case involves a photograph and even more so when it is a 
“common” landscape, that the defendant will –at some point– try to challenge the 
copyright protection of that photograph on the grounds that it does not constitute 
a work. This is why the cjeu –based on the Painer case17– refers to the standards 
set out in the Infopaq18 judgment. According to the aforementioned precedents 
–primarily the Infopaq case– it must be said that the requirements for copyright 
protection in Europe are relatively low. The only condition is for the work to be an 
“author´s intellectual creation that reflects his personality and is result of his free 
and creative decisions”. As stated by the cjeu, determining whether it constitutes 
a work or not, will always be the responsibility of the national court (para. 14). In 
this respect, the court acted correctly.
3.2. Communication to the public
First, the court seems to be correct when it states in paragraph 16 of the judgment 
that any use of a work by a third party without the prior consent of the author, 
10 C-135/10, Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 15 March 2012, 
ecli:eu:C:2012:140.
11 C-306/05, Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 7 December 2006, 
ecli:eu:C:2006:764.
12 C-403/08, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 4 October 2011, 
ecli:eu:C:2011:631.
13 C610/15, Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 14 June 2017, ECLI: EU: 
C: 2017: 456.
14 C138/16, Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber), 16 March 2017, 
ecli:eu:C:2017:218.
15 C160/15, Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 8 September 2016, 
ecli:eu:C:2016:644.
16 C466/12, Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 13 February 2014, 
ecli:eu:C:2014:76.
17 C-145/10, Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 1 December 2011, 
ecli:eu:C:2011:798.
18 C5/08, Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 16 July 2009, ecli:eu:C:2009:465.
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infringes copyrights (without prejudice to the application of the exceptions and 
limitations established in Law). It is a common misconception that just because a 
work is on the Internet without visible security measures, it means that it can be 
freely reproduced, communicated, or distributed. It is different to enjoy the work 
as a simple user than to copy that work and make it available to the public. The 
latter act directly infringes the author’s economic rights, specifically the rights of 
reproduction and communication to the public.
Although the act of reproduction carried out by the student is clear and consti-
tutes, in principle at least, a violation of copyrights, there is no unanimity regarding 
the infringement of the right of communication to the public by publishing the 
document on the school’s website. The concept of “communication to the public” 
has been widely discussed by doctrine and in the European jurisprudence, since 
its meaning and extent were not defined by Directive 2001/29/EC, so it has been 
the task of the cjeu to develop it. Under the criteria established by the cjeu (in 
Stichting Brein), according to the text of Article 3.1 of Directive 2001/29/EC, 
communication to the public has two cumulative criteria: there must be an “act 
of communication”; and the communication of that work must be “to the public”. 
This has been the criteria established by European case law and I personally agree 
with this reasoning.
Regarding the first element, namely the existence of an “act of communica-
tion”, for such an act to exist it is sufficient “that a work is made available to a 
public in such a way that the persons forming that public may access it, irrespec-
tive of whether or not they avail themselves of that opportunity” (para. 20). In 
my opinion, by uploading a file on the school’s website including a copy of Mr. 
Renckhoff ’s photograph, an “act of communication” of that work is obviously be-
ing carried out. “Such a posting gives visitors to the website on which it is posted 
the opportunity to access the photograph” (para. 21). 
Regarding the second requirement, namely communication “to the public”, 
it is clear from the Court’s case-law19 that the concept of “public” refers to an in-
determinate number of potential recipients. Those would be the total amount of 
people who have access to the school’s website. Bearing in mind that this website is 
completely open and freely accessible, we must understand “public” as any user of 
the network. Therefore, the second requirement for communication to the public 
has been fulfilled (para. 23). So far, following the strict requirements established by 
Article 3.1 of Directive 2001/29/EC, we can affirm that in the Cordoba case exists 
a “communication to the public” and no further requirements should be imposed.
However, the court recognizes a number of extra requirements which on 
paragraph 24 which, although widely used in the jurisprudence of this court, are 
not in my opinion covered by Directive 2001/29/EC and have only made the 
problem worse rather than solving it. According to the Court’s reiterated case law, 
19 Svensson and Stichting Brein.
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in order to be qualified as “communication to the public”, the communication of 
a protected work must, in addition to the two analyzed requirements, “be made 
using a technique different from those previously used”, or to a “new public”. 
That is, a public that was not taken into account by the copyright owner when 
he authorized the original communication of the work. In the Cordoba case, the 
discussion does not come from the use of a different technique, but from the issue 
of whether the photograph was presented to a “new public”. 
There were two conflicting approaches on this regard20. On one hand, the 
Land of North Rhine-Westphalia and the Italian Government claim, on the basis 
of the Svensson decision, that “there is no need to draw a distinction between the 
communication of a work by posting it on a website and the communication of 
such a work by including a hyperlink on a website which leads to another website 
on which that work was originally communicated without any restriction and with 
the consent of the copyright holder. Thus, in circumstances such as those at issue 
in the main proceedings, the work has not been communicated to a new public” 
(para. 27). On the other hand, Mr. Renckhoff, the French Government, and the 
Commission, argue that the Svensson case law is not relevant because this is not the 
same situation. In the Cordoba case, the communication is not made by means 
of a hyperlink, but the work itself is placed on a website, different from the one 
where it was already made available with authorization of the copyright holder. 
This constitutes a “new communication to the public”. I personally consider that 
the latter is the correct approach.
But whenever the Svensson judgment is used as a basis, there will be criticism. 
For many specialists, this judgment is based on a mistaken argument, because it 
considers that hyperlinks are not even an act of communication21. Without entering 
20 “The parties to the main proceedings and the interested parties referred to in 
Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union who have 
submitted written observations disagree…” [para. 26]. The aforementioned article 23 of 
the statute states the following: “… the decision of the court or tribunal of a Member 
State which suspends its proceedings and refers a case to the Court of Justice shall be 
notified to the Court by the court or tribunal concerned. The decision shall then be 
notified by the Registrar of the Court to the parties, to the Member States and to the 
Commission, and to the institution, body, office or agency of the Union which adopted 
the act the validity or interpretation of which is in dispute. Within two months of this 
notification, the parties, the Member States, the Commission and, where appropriate, the 
institution, body, office or agency which adopted the act the validity or interpretation of 
which is in dispute, shall be entitled to submit statements of case or written observations 
to the Court.” That is why the court analyzes the opinions that were presented by the 
Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, the Italian Government, Mr. Renckhoff, the French 
Government and the Commission. 
21 “It seems misconceived to say that … [links]…constitute making available…all 
they have done is referred other users to where the files may be readily found. In other 
words, they have provided a form of citation to the copyright works. Thus, it is sub-
mitted that inserting a hyperlink in this manner would not and should not constitute 
making available to the public.” Aplin, Tanya. Copyright Law in the Digital Society: The 
Challenges of Multimedia, London, Hart Publishing, 2005, 320 p. This same criterion was 
defended in Paperboy case i ZR 259/00 (17 July 2003) in Germany and Perfect 10 vs. 
Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d 828 (C.D.Cal.2006), 487 F.3d 701 (usca, 9th Cir. 2007) 
in United States. As Abella J. explained in Canadian case Crookes vs. Newton, [2011] 
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into a criticism of the Svensson ruling, since it is not the subject of this analysis, I 
must point out that this criterion of the “new public” is not recognized in Union 
law. It was an extra requirement created by the cjeu itself 22. 
Paragraph 35 of the judgment is therefore confusing, inaccurate, and incon-
gruous, since here the cjeu is attempting to introduce into the discussion of the 
case the controversial doctrine of the “new public” brought about by the Svensson 
judgment. If we were to state that the Cordoba and Svensson cases are the same, 
taking into account that the first communication was made with a totally open 
character and without restrictions, no “new public” could be considered to exist and 
therefore, there would be no act of communication or infraction. Here the weakness 
of the so-called “new public” criterion is evident, that if we apply it in the same 
way to Cordoba, we would have to affirm that it is not an act of communication, 
when it is. In my opinion, the court in the Cordoba case should not have used this 
theory, but rather missed a perfect opportunity to criticize it. I believe that in the 
Svensson case, which has had serious implications for subsequent cases, another 
strategy should have been adopted and this theory of the “new public” should not 
have been used23, which has brought about so many questionable interpretations. 
A direct analogy should not be established between Svensson and Cordoba, 
because they are not similar cases. While in Svensson only one link was established 
and no work was copied, in the Córdoba case a work that was on a website was 
reproduced on another server and uploaded. Clearly, there is a difference between 
both cases. The hyperlink would be a “secondary communication”24 which will 
scc 47, [2011] scr 269, at [26], [30], (in a case concerning hyperlinks and defamation): 
“Communicating something is very different from merely communicating that something 
exists or where it exists.  The former involves dissemination of the content, and suggests 
control over both the content and whether the content will reach an audience at all, 
while the latter does not…. Hyperlinks … share the same relationship with the content 
to which they refer as do references. Both communicate that something exists, but do 
not, by themselves, communicate its content. And they both require some act on the 
part of a third party before he or she gains access to the content. The fact that access 
to that content is far easier with hyperlinks than with footnotes does not change the 
reality that a hyperlink, by itself, is content-neutral — it expresses no opinion, nor does 
it have any control over, the content to which it refers”. These arguments are supported 
by the European Copyright Society and in my opinion, they are the criteria that should 
have been followed in the Svensson case and not the controversial theory of the “new 
public”, which has caused so much legal uncertainty.
22 Dr. Mihály J. Ficsor in his document “Svensson: honest attempt at establishing 
due balance concerning the use of hyperlinks – spoiled by the erroneous ‘new public’ 
theory” makes a deep and extensive criticism of the Svensson ruling and particularly the 
use of the “new public” criterion. Retrieved on 9/7/2020 from [http://www.copyright-
seesaw.net/en/papers?page=5]. 
23 Hugenholtz P. B. and Van Velze, S. C. “Communication to a new public? three 
reasons why EU copyright law can do without a ‘New public’”, In iiC-International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law. April, 2016. 47(7), p. 797-816. 
This same criterion has been used by the European Copyright Society in its analysis of 
the Svensson case. Retrieved on 9/7/2020 from [https://europeancopyrightsociety.org/
opinion-on-the-reference-to-the-cjeu-in-case-c-46612-svensson/].     
24 “There is a secondary communication only when there is a retransmission of a 
communication. In the case of Dirk Renckhoff, it was not the communication made by 
www.schwarzaufweiss that was retransmitted … on the contrary, the school communicated 
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always depend on a “primary communication”, if the original source disappears, 
the link will be useless. In the case of a hyperlink, the author will always main-
tain control over the work and can always remove it from the primary site. “On 
the other hand, uploading the work and making it available on another site is 
an act of primary communication, which is no longer dependent on any initial 
communication”25. In the Cordoba case, a first act of reproduction is committed 
and by uploading this copy to the school’s website a new act of communication 
is carried out, totally independent and different from the one made in the travel 
site. According to the European Copyright Society “in the former situation the 
copyright holder is no longer in a position to exercise his power of control over 
the communication of that content.”26.
The court continues assessing possible implications of not recognizing these 
acts as a “communication to the public”. To affirm that copying and uploading 
the photograph is not an act of communication would be to apply indirectly the 
rule of exhaustion to the right of communication to the public. This conclusion 
is also established by the court27. The exhaustion as a limitation to the author’s 
right applies, by European standards, only to the right of distribution (Article 4.2 
Directive 2001/29/EC28). It should be noted that Article 3.3 expressly prohibits 
the application of the doctrine of exhaustion to the right of communication to 
the public. In this respect we must also take into account Recital 28 and 29[29] of 
the Directive 2001/29/EC and the Tom Kabinet judgment (C263/18), where it is 
concluded that exhaustion affects the physical copies of the work and in this case 
we are referring to a digital photograph. It is another element against the applica-
tion of exhaustion to this case30. 
the photo using a copy residing on its own site”. Association Littéraire et Artistique 
Internationale (alai) opinion on case C/161/17. Retrieved on 13/7/2020 from [https://
www.alai.org/en/assets/files/resolutions/180529-opinion-land-nordrhein-westfalen-en.pdf ].
25 Synodinou, T. E. “The Renckhoff case: 6 degrees of separation from the lawful 
user”, In Era Forum. July, vol. 20, n.º 1, 2019, pp. 21-33. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
26 Retrieved on 9/7/2020 from [https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.
com/2018/10/ecs-opinion-renckhoff-cordoba-final.pdf ].
27 “Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/29 specifically provides that the right of commu-
nication to the public … is not exhausted by any act of communication to the public 
or making available to the public within the meaning of that provision… To hold that 
the posting on one website of a work previously communicated on another website with 
the consent of the copyright holder does not constitute making available to a new public 
would amount to applying an exhaustion rule to the right of communication.” [para. 33]. 
28 “[…] 2. The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in 
respect of the original or copies of the work, except where the first sale or other transfer 
of ownership in the Community of that object is made by the rightholder or with his 
consent.”
29 Recital 28: “Copyright protection under this Directive includes the exclusive right 
to control distribution of the work incorporated in a tangible article…”. Recital 29: 
“The question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of services and on-line services 
in particular… Unlike cd-rom or cd-i, where the intellectual property is incorporated 
in a material medium, namely an item of goods, every on-line service is in fact an act 
which should be subject to authorisation where the copyright or related right so provides”.
30 It is obvious that the rules developed in the Oracle case (C-128/11) do not apply 
here either, since it is a photograph, not software.
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3.3. Educational context as a possible exception
The reason for the cjeu interpretation is only with regard to whether the act car-
ried out constitutes a public communication of the work. Nevertheless, I consider 
that the court should have at least developed some arguments on the possible ap-
plication to this particular case of an exception based on educational purposes (it 
referred to this issue to some extent in paragraphs 42 and 43, albeit superficially). 
This analysis is important in determining whether, or not, the act performed by the 
student and the school eventually constitutes an infringement, and in this respect 
I agree with the Advocate General’s assertion that considerations of reasonableness 
should be applicable31.
Under the particular conditions of the case, it could be said that the criteria 
of the three-step test are met, since this exception is expressly defined in German 
law32. Also, there is no conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and no 
unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right holder. While Recital 
4 and 9 of Directive 2001/29/EC foster a high level of protection for authors, 
we should not forget that copyright is based on a balance between the rights of 
users to access works and the rights of right holders to obtain fair remuneration. 
The use of the photograph in this case does not appear to affect the economic 
interests of the author. 
Users’ rights are reflected in the exceptions set out in Article 5 of Directive 
2001/29/EC, one of which is “use for educational purposes”. Although the excep-
tions and limitations to rights must, in principle, be interpreted restrictively, we 
should remember that the education is a fundamental right recognized in Article 
14 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must not be unjustifiably limited 
either. Correct proportionality must therefore be established in these cases, seek-
ing to preserve the balance that must characterize copyright33. In this particular 
case, although it is an infringement of the right of communication to the public 
as we discussed before, I believe that exceptions such as those in Article 5(3)(a) 
and 5(3)(d) of the Directive 2001/29/EC (transposed into German law by the 
Urheberrechtsgesetz – UrhG) can be applied to the main proceeding.
31 This exception can be found in Article 10 of the Berne Convention, and was 
adopted by Directive 2001/29/EC in its article 5(3)(a) and (d).
32 The Urheberrechtsgesetz – UrhG (Act on Copyright and Related Rights) recognizes 
in its subdivision 4 Lawfully permitted uses for teaching, science and institutions. Specifi-
cally, in section 60a (2), the copyright exception for educational and teaching purposes 
is legally recognized.
33 As recognized in Recital 31 of the Infosoc Directive: “a fair balance of rights and 
interests between […] the different categories of rightholders and users of protected 
subject-matter must be safeguarded”.
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